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Paula A. Monopoli*

The American Bar Association recently revised the ethical rules that govern lawyers.
Its Ethics 2000 Commission proposed a number of changes to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, including revisions to the rules that affect how the profession
handles conflicts of interest in the area of attorneys who draft instruments that name
themselves as fiduciaries. The intersection of these changes, with their subsequent
clarification by an ABA opinion issued in May 2002, has broad implications for
attorneys practicing in this area. Given the increasing elderly population, the trillions
of dollars that they are transferring to their baby-boomer children, and the shrinking
number of banks willing to assume the role of fiduciary, there is an argument that the
profession should be encouraging its members to take on this role for clients. However,
the financial interest that the drafting attorney has in the fiduciary fee and the
information asymmetry between lawyers and most clients create a conflict of interest.
This article explores the ethical norm that resulted from the Ethics 2000 revisions to the
Model Rules and the issuance of the ABA opinion interpreting those revisions. It
explores the flaws in this norm and how it might be revised to better minimize the agency
costs that exist while remaining consistent with the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The convergence of the historic transfer of trillions of dollars from the
World War II generation to its baby-boomer children and fundamental
changes in the banking industry that have left many middle-class Americans
without the option of a corporate fiduciary create both an opportunity and an
ethical dilemma for the legal profession.1 Lawyers are generally good
candidates to provide fiduciary services. They have specialized skill,
knowledge, and ethical training that provide value to their clients and that can
yield profits to them if they contract with the clients to act both as the lawyer
who drafts their estate planning instruments and as the fiduciary who will
execute those instruments. This dual role raises ethical concerns that
implicate the rules governing solicitation of clients and the provision of
independent legal advice. This article focuses on the latter issue and the
current ethical rules that govern this contractual relationship.

1. See John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate Is Still
Valid: A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. GIFT PLAN . 11 (2003) (defending the continuing
validity of their “low-growth minimum estimate” of the transfer of wealth over the years 1998-2052),
available at http://www.bc.edu/research/swri/meta-elements/pdf/41trillionreview.pdf; Alan Newman,
Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System
of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487,
517-18 n.135 (2000) (discussing various estimates of the wealth transfer to the Baby Boomer generation,
ranging from $10.4 trillion to $136 trillion). For a general analysis of the shifts in the banking industry due
to mergers, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV . 215; see also John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 638 (1995) (stating that
“[p]rivate trustees still abound, but the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid professional, whose
business is to enter into and carry out trust agreements”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of
Trust Law, 89 CORNE LL L. REV . 621, 633-34 n.57 (2004) (citing Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory
of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNE LL L. REV . 767, 775 (2000)) (stating that “the vast majority of trusts
are administered by large financial institutions such as trust companies”). Sitkoff also notes the lack of
empirical data in this area. Id. at 648.
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The drafting attorney/client relationship in this context actually involves
a two-tiered transaction. The first step is a contractual negotiation for the
legal drafting services and independent advice of the lawyer and the second
is for non-legal service, that of being an executor or trustee.2 Each of these
transactions has aspects of an agency contract. They implicate the typical
problems raised by any agency contract, but they also involve a more complex
set of regulatory parameters, including not just agency law but also fiduciary
law, ethical codes, and even contract law. Monitoring and enforcement issues
inherent in typical agency contracts are exacerbated by the fact that many of
these clients are elderly when entering into the initial contracts for drafting
services and are dead when the agents begin to perform their duties.
Information asymmetry, in particular, and the risk of overreaching by the
lawyer are significant problems given the age and/or lack of sophistication of
most estate planning clients.3
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(hereinafter the “Model Rules”) were modified by the ABA’s Commission on
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter “Ethics 2000”).
When the new language is read together with a subsequent ABA opinion
interpreting those revisions, the Model Rules now allow a lawyer to seek such
an appointment. They also subject this type of attorney-client transaction to
the conflicts of interest provisions of Rule 1.7 only if the lawyer decides that
her financial interest in the transaction will impair her independent advice to

2. There is some scholarly discussion of whether the ethical rules of the legal profession should
extend to this second-tier transaction since it involves a non-legal service. The consensus seems to be that
they should, and this article will not explore that conclusion, though it should be noted that it is an
interesting and complex question. See, e.g., Andrew M. Goldner, Minding Someone Else’s Businesses:
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7 Leads the Way, 11 GEO . J. LEGAL ETHICS 767, 785 (1998)
(discussing the issue in the area of multidisciplinary practices and urging other states to follow
Pennsylvania’s lead in applying rules of ethics to lawyers’ nonlegal transactions).
3. See Joseph A. Rosenberg, Adapting Unitary Principles of Professional Responsibility to Unique
Practice Contexts: A Reflective Model for Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in Elder Law, 31 LOY . U. CHI. L.J.
403, 410-11 & n.21 (2000) (“The ever increasing number of older adults, including those with Alzheimer’s
Disease or other forms of dementia, and people with developmental disabilities and other neurological
impairments present ethical issues that are far removed from the paradigmatic client envisioned by the
drafters of codes of conduct.”). He goes on to cite statistics on aging that have important public policy
implications: “Between 1990 and 1995, the number of people age 65 and older increased by 48 million to
a total of 368 million, which represented 6.4% of the world’s population.” Id. at 410 n.21 (citing Kevin
Kinsella, The Demography of an Aging World, in THE CULTUR AL CONTEXT OF AGING: WORLDWIDE
PERSPECTIVES 17, 18 (Jay Sokolovsky ed., 2d ed. 1997)). In our country, “[a]s a result of low birth rates
prior to and during World War II, the elderly population will remain relatively static between 1995 and
2010. Beginning in 2010, however, the elderly population will rapidly increase as the so-called ‘baby
boomers’ begin to reach age 65.” Id. (citations omitted).
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the client on the best candidate for fiduciary. This article will argue that this
post-Ethics 2000 ethical norm4 is flawed and itself needs revision. It ignores
long-standing ethical traditions in this area and actually increases the costs
involved in using lawyers as fiduciaries.
This article will make the argument that the rules should provide
mandatory disclosure in every case in which a drafting attorney is named as
a fiduciary, recognizing the fact that such a transaction is a per se conflict of
interest. Fashioning an ethical norm that requires mandatory disclosure in all
cases is consistent with the traditional fiduciary view of the attorney-client
relationship. American jurisprudence has long described lawyers as having
a fiduciary relationship with their clients that carries with it certain duties,
including the duty of loyalty.5 Lawyers are bound to provide independent
professional judgment and to give clients candid advice.6 However, the
relationship between an attorney and client is also a business relationship.
The client contracts with the attorney to perform certain acts on behalf of the
client in exchange for consideration, the attorney’s fee. The client is paying
the attorney to give him legal advice and to act as his agent. Thus, the
attorney-client relationship is a multi-faceted relationship, characterized by
aspects of fiduciary, agency, and arm’s-length contractual relationships.7
Financial conflicts of interest in particular impair an attorney’s ability to
render independent legal advice to the client. Under the ethical rules
governing the profession, attorneys must represent their clients without regard
to their own financial interests.8 In the area of estate planning, an attorney

4. This article will use the term “ethical norm” when referring to the Ethics 2000 revisions to the
Model Rules. “Norm,” rather than “rule,” is used here because the Model Rules still do not contain any
separate rule governing this type of situation. There is only a Comment to a rule governing the issue of
attorneys drafting wills that make them beneficiaries, not a separate rule.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000); MODEL RULES
OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.7 cmt. 1, 1.7 cmt. 6, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10 (2002). For an excellent article that
addresses the topic of fiduciary duty, agency relationships and durable powers of attorney, see Karen E.
Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV .
1, Part III (2001).
6. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (5th ed. 2003).
7. For an insightful description of the complexity of the attorney-client relationship and the risks
of trying to categorize it, see Robert Condlin, “What’s Love Got To Do With It?”—“It’s Not Like They’re
Your Friends for Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB . L.
REV . 211 (2003). See also Richard A. Corwin, Ethical Considerations: The Attorney-Client Relationship,
75 TUL. L. REV . 1327 (2001); Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “Non-Clients”:
Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently
Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV . 659 (1994); Douglas K. Schnell, Note, Don’t Just Hit Send:
Unsolicited E-Mail and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 533 (2004).
8. For example, there is an ethical rule that restricts an attorney from becoming involved in a
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named as a fiduciary stands to gain financially not only from her role as
attorney for the client, but in her separate role as fiduciary. Thus, this
potential financial gain by the attorney in being appointed may well affect the
likelihood that the attorney will tell the client that other parties, for example,
family members or banks, may also be good candidates for the position of
executor or trustee.
Given the nature of the increasing social need for fiduciaries, this article
begins with the premise that facilitating such contracts increases the social
good and provides value both to the attorneys involved and the clients who get
special knowledge and skill from attorneys they have come to know and trust.9
However, given the information asymmetry involved in these relationships,
a rule that requires full disclosure and informed consent is a sound approach
in this context. It best balances the interests of the client in choosing his
attorney as fiduciary with the interest in decreasing the risk of opportunistic
behavior that exists in this situation.
Part II of this article will review the traditional fiduciary view of the
attorney-client relationship. Part III will piece together the ethical norm that
governs drafting attorney/fiduciaries in the wake of the American Bar
Association’s Ethics 2000 revisions to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and their issuance of an opinion that attempts to interpret those
changes. Part IV will propose an alternative ethical rule that balances
efficiency and fairness and that facilitates the use of lawyers as fiduciaries.
Part V concludes that the choice of an ethical rule will have a significant
impact on the regulation and perception of the legal profession for many years
to come.

business transaction with a client. The underlying concern is that such an interest impairs the attorney’s
ability to make independent judgments in the client’s best interests. Rule 1.8 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: (1) the
transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by
the client; (2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable
opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and (3) the client
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction
and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in
the transaction.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2002). See generally Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics Issues:
“You Can’t Teach Ethics,” PLI/EST. 657 (2004) (describing the impact of the Model Rules on the
profession as a whole and the additional impact of the law of agency on these issues in particular).
9. However see discussion infra at note 122 with regard to those who would view allowing any
waiver of this conflict to constitute a “logical fallacy” given the underlying fiduciary duty.
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II. THE NATURE OF THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT RELA TION SHIP
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (hereinafter
“Restatement”) posits a multi-faceted view of the attorney-client relationship.
The premise that attorneys have a heightened duty to their clients when
contracting for services beyond that of two arm’s-length parties to a contract
runs throughout the Restatement. Ethics scholar Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
states that “the formation of the client-lawyer relationship [is] primarily but
not exclusively a contract arrangement,”10 while the Reporter for the
Restatement, Charles W. Wolfram, states that a “lawyer is a fiduciary.”11
Thus, the Restatement generally characterizes the relationship between a
client and his attorney as a fiduciary relationship,12 while providing that some
of the attorney’s duties may be altered through contract.13 It also characterizes
the original formation of the relationship as a mostly, but not entirely,
contractual event.14 In the Introduction, the Reporter emphasizes the fact that
the relationship between a client and his attorney is based primarily upon
agency law.15 The relationship is formed voluntarily and the lawyer is
entrusted with information and matters that may be sensitive and may make
the client “vulnerable to harm.”16 Furthermore, the actions of the
attorney/agent, because of their intricacy and technical nature, may not be
readily monitored by the client/principal.17 The Restatement characterizes the
relationship as primarily one of agency. However, because of the delicate
nature of the material the client has entrusted to the lawyer, the Restatement
“provides a number of safeguards for clients beyond those generally provided
to principals.”18

10. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS, at XXI (2000).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000).
12. Id.
13. See id. § 16 cmt. f.
14. See id. § 14 and cmts.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 2, introductory note (2000).
Agency law has been defined as a mostly fiduciary relationship with the ability to alter the duties of the
agent to the principal through contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 12, 13, 14 (1958)
(describing Agent as Holder of a Power, Agent as a Fiduciary, and Control by Principal, respectively).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 2, introductory note (2000).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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In general, a lawyer has four duties to her client, not including any other
duties that are stated throughout the Restatement and those prescribed by
“general law.”19 The four basic duties are to:
(1) proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives, as
defined by the client after consultation; (2) act with reasonable competence and
diligence; (3) comply with obligations concerning the client’s confidences and property,
avoid impermissible conflicting interests, deal honestly with the client, and not employ
advantages arising from the client-lawyer relationship in a manner adverse to the client;
and (4) fulfill valid contractual obligations to the client.20

The duty of loyalty, inherent in (3), and the duties defined by contract
embodied in (4) are discussed at length in the Comments to the Restatement.21
For example, under the duty of loyalty, the lawyer must act in a way that best
promotes the interests of the client.22 Furthermore, the lawyer may not misuse
information given to her by the client and must safeguard the information from
others’ misuse.23 As stated in the Comment, “[a] lawyer must be honest with
a client.”24 A lawyer may not use her position to “obtain [an] unfair
contract[ ]” or do anything that would “create risk to the lawyer’s independent
judgment.”25
The duties that a lawyer owes the client may be adjusted or defined in
scope by contract prior to the representation.26 There are general parameters
for valid contracts between a lawyer and her client, including, for example, fee
schedules and appropriate contractual limitations on the duties that a lawyer
owes a client.27 In addition to these general rules for the validity of such
contracts,28 several other sections deal with more specific clauses and terms
of contracts, for example, attempts to limit a client’s rights. The Restatement
also includes limits on malpractice liability waivers and contractual waivers
of conflicts of interest.29

19. Id. § 16 cmt. a (suggesting that these duties appear only to extend to the client after the attorney
has assented to the representation).
20. Id. § 16.
21. Id. § 16 cmts. e, f.
22. Id. § 16 cmt. e.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. A lawyer who drafts himself/herself into the position of executor or trustee without full
disclosure would arguably be taking advantage of the situation to “obtain [an] unfair contract[ ].” Id.
26. Id. § 16 cmt. f.
27. Id. § 18 and cmts.
28. Id. § 18 cmt. a.
29. Id.
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Generally, a contract between a lawyer and her client will be valid, unless
the contract or “modification is made beyond a reasonable time after the
lawyer has begun to represent the client in the matter” or “the contract is made
after the lawyer has finished providing services.”30 If a modification is made
beyond a reasonable time, or if the contract is not made until after the services
have been provided, the client may attempt to avoid the contract because of
the implications that the lawyer used her unfair leverage to secure the
contract.31 The lawyer must demonstrate that the contract was fair in the
circumstances and that no pressure was placed upon the client to agree to the
contract in order for such a contract to be deemed valid.32 Otherwise, the
contract will be construed as “between client and lawyer as a reasonable
person in the circumstances of the client would have construed it.”33 There
are three reasons for construing these contracts from the client’s perspective.34
“First, lawyers almost always write such contracts” and general contract law
usually points to construing contracts against the drafter.35 Second, lawyers
are the more sophisticated party and are better trained to find errors and
omissions in contracts and correct them. 36 Third, there is consensus that
lawyers should inform their clients of all the risks and benefits of the contracts
to which they agree.37 That latter duty to inform is again beyond the
traditional notions of the obligations between contracting parties.
There are limits on the lawyer’s ability to restrict her duties to her client
by agreement.38 These rules are aimed at the duties determined at the outset
of the relationship, as opposed to waiver or ratification of actions done ex post
facto to shield the lawyer or client from liability.39 The Restatement allows
for modification and limitation of such duties as long as the client is
“adequately informed” and “the terms of the limitation are reasonable in the
circumstances.”40 If a client makes the choice to limit her lawyer’s duties to

30. Id. § 18(1)(a)-(b).
31. Id. § 18 cmts. e, f.
32. Id. § 18 cmt. e.
33. Id. § 18(2).
34. Id. § 18 cmt. h.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. With such contracts being construed in the light most favorable to the client, this may imply
that full disclosure must have taken place in order for such contracts to sustain scrutiny.
38. See id. § 19.
39. Id. § 19 cmt. a.
40. Id. § 19(1)(a)-(b). This statement reflects the duty of full disclosure embodied in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2c, 1.2 cmts. 6-8, 1.8h, 1.8 cmts.
2, 14 (2002).
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her, the Restatement contains requirements aimed at protecting the client in
this circumstance.
In addition to the duties outlined above, the lawyer has ongoing duties
during the course of representation. These include the duty to “inform and
consult” with the client (including dealing with clients with “diminished
capacity”),41 the duty to keep confidential all information that a client shares
with an attorney,42 and the duty to avoid and prevent conflicts of interest with
the client.43
Thus, the Restatement provides guidance as to the nature of the attorneyclient relationship. In doing so, it confers duties on the attorney that go
beyond those owed by one arm’s-length contracting party to another. In
conjunction with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it provides the
ethical construct within which lawyers are regulated. The changes to the
Model Rules after Ethics 2000, when read together with an ABA opinion
interpreting those changes in the context of a drafting attorney naming herself
as a fiduciary, leave an ambiguous and less than optimal ethical norm in this
area.
III. THE POST -ETHICS 2000 ETHICAL NORM FOR DRAFTING
ATTORNEY /FIDUCIARIES
The multi-faceted nature of the attorney-client relationship is reflected in
the dual nature of the ethical codes and rules that govern the profession.
Ethics codes are typically seen as moral guides to professional behavior, yet
they also reflect the economic relationship that exists when an attorney agrees
to represent a client and give that client her independent legal advice.44
In estate planning, that legal advice includes the attorney educating the
client as to the nature of the post-death estate administration process. The
attorney must advise the client that he needs to name a fiduciary—an executor
and/or trustee—as part of the planning process. In its most recent ethics
opinion on the subject, the ABA described a lawyer’s basic duties in the
context of advising a client on his choice of fiduciaries:

41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 20 and cmts., 24 and cmts.
42. See id. §§ 59-67 and cmts. (explaining generally lawyer-client confidentiality).
43. See id. §§ 121-127 and cmts. (explaining generally conflicts of interests).
44. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflicts of Interest
Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV . 965 (1997).
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One of a lawyer’s important responsibilities in providing estate planning for his client is
to help her select an appropriate personal representative to administer her estate and a
trustee to manage any trust established by the will. . . . The lawyer is required by Rule
1.4(b) . . . to discuss frankly with the client her options in selecting an individual to serve
as fiduciary. . . . This discussion should cover information reasonably adequate to permit
the client to understand the tasks to be performed by the fiduciary; the fiduciary’s desired
skills; the kinds of individuals or entities likely to serve most effectively, such as
professionals, corporate fiduciaries, and family members; and the benefits and detriments
of using each, including relative costs.45

In a previous article, Fiduciary Duty: A New Ethical Paradigm for
Lawyer/Fiduciaries, this author left for a future work a more in-depth
exploration of some of the conceptual conflicts raised when an attorney acts
to draft both an instrument and names herself as a fiduciary.46 Rather than
delving into those issues at length, the previous article focused on significant
procedural reforms necessary to implement the conceptual model embraced
by this author. The prior article noted that the trusts and estates community
was awaiting guidance from the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, which had not yet issued their opinion on this
issue when the prior article went to press.47 This section begins where that
article, written before more “guidance” had come down from the ABA, left off
with regard to the conceptual issues involved in drafting attorneys naming
themselves as fiduciaries. When eventually issued, the ABA opinion created
significant ambiguity when read together with the Ethics 2000 revisions.48
That ambiguity warrants the closer look at the issue taken in this article. This
section reiterates the description of the traditional ethical norm, as well as the
Ethics 2000 changes in this area. It then integrates and evaluates the impact
of the new ABA opinion on that ethical norm.
The author’s previous article notes that the traditional ethical rules have
historically discouraged a lawyer from asking her client to name her as
executor or trustee. The profession’s longstanding position has been that, “so
long as the client originally had the idea for the attorney to serve as fiduciary,
then there were no ethical violations.”49 The Model Code of Professional

45. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-426 (2002) (addressing a
lawyer serving as a fiduciary for an estate or trust) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 02-426].
46. Paula A. Monopoli, Fiduciary Duty: A New Ethical Paradigm for Lawyer/Fiduciaries, 67 MO .
L. REV . 309, 312 n.8 (2002).
47. See id. at 334 n.97.
48. ABA Formal Op. 02-426.
49. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 328 n.75 (citing Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello,
The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles: Policy and Ethical Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV . 1357,
1376 (1994)). As Spurgeon and Ciccarello have noted, the 1908 Canons of Professional Responsibility,
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Responsibility was adopted in 1969. It included Ethical Consideration (“EC”)
5-6 which provided that: “a lawyer should not consciously influence a client
to name him as executor, trustee or lawyer in such instrument. In those cases
where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the
lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.”50 Ethical considerations
under the Model Code were aspirational rather than mandatory disciplinary
rules.51
In 1983, the ABA adopted the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. These superseded the Model Code and, unlike the Model Code, the
Model Rules did not include the prior Ethical Consideration 5-6 nor any
similar provision. The Model Rules subsumed the issue of drafting attorneys
under the more general conflict of interest provisions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8.
This excision of EC 5-6 was apparently a gradual process since there is
evidence that an early draft of the Model Rules contained a note in the
Commentary that a lawyer should not “seek” to have himself named in an
instrument as executor. However, that note was not included in the final
version of the Model Rules.52 Since the Model Rules no longer specifically
addressed lawyers being named as, and acting in the role of, fiduciary, the
result was that lawyers had less explicit guidance about assuming the role of
executor or trustee than they did under the Model Code prior to 1983. One

the precursor to the Model Code, were not seen as prohibiting the practice of lawyers acting as executors.
Id. at 1376. Spurgeon and Ciccarello cite Henry S. Drinker and Joseph A. deFuria, both of whom note the
lack of concern about lawyers serving as fiduciaries. See id. at 1375 n.73, 1376 n.74. See also Ronald
Chester, The Lawyer as Charitable Fiduciary: Public Trust or Private Gain, 25 PAC . L.J. 1353, 1356 n.20
(noting that “[a]lthough not explicitly prohibited by disciplinary or other rules, the attorney’s conduct in
being named a fiduciary does represent a potential conflict of interest violating the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty to the charitable entity” and citing to the deFuria article).
50. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 328 n.76 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC
5-6 (1969), reprinted in JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFE SSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES &
STATUTES 429 (West Group ed., 2002-03) (1959)) (noting that in addition to the ABA Model Rules, there
are other sources of law that inform the ethical rules in this area, including the American Law Institute’s
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS). For a list of all these sources, see Report of
the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility, Preparation of Wills and Trusts that Name
Drafting Lawyer as Fiduciary, 28 REAL PROP. PROB . & TR . J. 803, 806-07 (1994) [hereinafter Report of
the Special Study Committee]. See also State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W.2d 733 (Wis. 1972) (finding that
drafting attorney must be especially careful that he does not in any way suggest or insinuate that he be
appointed in a fiduciary capacity). More recently see Estate of Peterson, 565 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (noting that the drafting attorney must not promote himself or herself or consciously influence the
client in the decision). This case is discussed in depth, infra, at notes 112, 134 and accompanying text.
51. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 328 n.77 (citing Spurgeon & Ciccarello, supra note 49, at
1376).
52. See id. at 328 n.78 (citing Spurgeon & Ciccarello supra note 49, at 1377).
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might argue that this resulted in less protection for unsophisticated clients as
well.
In December 1993, a number of scholars convened a conference on these
and other related issues at Fordham University School of Law.53 Edward D.
Spurgeon and Mary Jane Ciccarello’s conference article advocated improved
disclosure and monitoring safeguards. They went on to endorse the idea of
revising the Model Rules to once again include more specific guidance to
lawyers in this area.54 The first opportunity to do so, following the 1993
Conference, was the formation of the American Bar Association’s Ethics 2000
Commission in 1997. The purpose of the Commission was to consider
comprehensive revisions to the Model Rules.55 The Commission completed
its work and issued its final report on November 27, 2000.56 The Commission
proposed hundreds of changes to the Model Rules, but none of these included
any provision that would reinstate the letter or the spirit of the old EC 5-6.
Despite the 1993 conference Working Report and the scholarship that came
out of it, the Commission failed to revive the more specific guidance lost
when EC 5-6 was written out in 1983. Ethics 2000 took the Model Rules from
an arguably neutral position on the issue to one that expressly allows lawyers
to “seek” such appointments, raising the serious question of whether the
profession now explicitly permits solicitation of clients by lawyers seeking to
be fiduciaries.57
This author’s previous article notes that in May of 2001, the Reporter for
Ethics 2000 posted the following response to a question posed during an ABA
Teleconference on the new rules as to whether the drafters had considered
reincorporating the Model Code’s EC 5-6 that “a lawyer should not

53. See Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients: Report
of the Working Group on Lawyer as Fiduciary, 62 FORDHAM L. REV . 1055 (1994) [hereinafter Report of
the Working Group].
54. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 329 n.80 (citing Spurgeon & Ciccarello, supra note 49, at
1357).
55. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of
the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO . J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002).
56. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 329 n.81 (citing James Podgers, New ABA Model Rules May
Be Under Construction in the Next Few Months, 87 A.B.A. J. 58 (2001)).
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a):
A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit professional
employment from a prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the
lawyer’s pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted: (1) is a lawyer; or (2) has a family, close
personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer.
Id. At least in the case of new clients, this section would seem to be in conflict with the Comment to Rule
1.8(c) which allows a lawyer to seek a lucrative appointment as executor or trustee.
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consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee or lawyer in
an instrument.” The Reporter for the Commission responded that:
The Commission is recommending that the text of Rule 1.8(c) be amended to prohibit
lawyers from soliciting “any substantial gift from a client including a testamentary gift.”
A new Comment [8] will provide as follows: “This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from
seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of
the client’s estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless,
such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7
when there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s interest in obtaining the appointment will
materially limit the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in advising the client
concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client’s
informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the
nature and extent of the lawyer’s financial interest in the appointment, as well as the
availability of alternative candidates for the position.”58

Not only did Ethics 2000 fail to reinstate the explicit prohibition against
consciously influencing a client to name one as a fiduciary, the new Comment
[8] states that “this Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the
lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client’s
estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position.”59 This language
does not prohibit lawyers from seeking to have their clients name them as a
fiduciary. 60 “Seek” is synonymous with “solicit”61 so the provision may be
read to mean that it will be acceptable for a lawyer to suggest that a client
name him or her as a fiduciary in the will that the lawyer is drafting.62 This
58. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 330 n.82 (citing the posting of Professor Nancy J. Moore,
nmoore@bu.edu, Boston University School of Law, Chief Reporter, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
(May 18, 2001) during ABA Teleconference on the Ethics 2000 proposed revisions (copy on file with
Author) (citing Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct (Proposed Reviews 2001), available at http://www.
abanet.org)). In the Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, the drafters state:
This new Comment clarifies a present ambiguity by addressing the question of whether appointment
of the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm as executor constitutes a “substantial gift” within the meaning of
this Rule. The commission believes that such appointments are not “gifts” but that they may create
a conflict of interest between the client and the lawyer that would be governed by Rule 1.7.
ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 1.8, Reporter’s
Explanation of Changes, Rule 1.8 (2001) [hereinafter ABA Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
e2k-rule18rem.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
59. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 330 n.83 (citing ABA Report, supra note 58).
60. See id. at 330 n.84 (citing ABA Report, supra note 58). “[T]he Comment does not specifically
apply to drafting attorneys. It seems to allow all lawyers to seek to have themselves named as executors or
any other lucrative fiduciary position.” Id.
61. See id. at 330 n.85 (citing R OGET ’S 21ST CENTURY THESAURUS 713 (2d ed. 1999)).
62. See id. at 330 n.86 (citing Report of the Special Study Committee, supra note 50, at 809 n.14).
That is contrary to the prior understanding that, while a drafting attorney may serve as a fiduciary, it is not
ethical for the lawyer to solicit—read seek—such appointment. It directly contradicts EC 5-6 as described
in a Reporter’s Note dropped from the final commentary to Model Rule 1.8 that “EC 5-6 of the Code states
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explicit allowance is inconsistent with the fiduciary view of the attorney-client
relationship in that it encourages the lawyer to take an advantage for herself,
given the client’s lack of information.
The second part of the Ethics 2000 Comment appears to be more
consistent with a fiduciary view of the attorney-client relationship. It includes
a provision that such lawyer/fiduciary appointments are subject to conflict of
interest rules under the Model Rules but only when there is a “significant risk
that the lawyer’s interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the
lawyer’s independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning
the choice of an executor or other fiduciary.”63 The sentence is then linked to
the next one providing for disclosure, but which presumably only requires
such disclosure and the client’s concomitant informed consent when the
lawyer determines that there is a conflict under Rule 1.7. The ambiguity here
leaves open the possibility that in many cases a lawyer will decide that her
judgment is not materially limited and thus no disclosure and informed
consent requirements would attach.
Ethics 2000 revised the definitions of “informed consent” and “confirmed
in writing.”64 These need to be read together with the Comment to give a full
picture of the revised norm under Comment [8]. “Informed consent” now
requires that attorneys not act prior to obtaining the consent of the client and
after providing the client with “adequate information.”65 Furthermore, the
consent of the client must be obtained in writing, presumably to avoid future
disagreements, even though the written statement of consent usually does not
have to be signed.66 “Confirmed in writing” complements the definition of

that a lawyer should not seek to have himself or a partner or associate named in an instrument as executor
of the client’s estate.” See id. at 330 n.87 (“The Author has suggested to the Ethics 2000 Commission that
the Comment could be changed to read: ‘This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from accepting an
appointment as executor or other potentially lucrative fiduciary position.’ This would still effectuate the
Commission’s desire to clarify that such appointments do not constitute ‘gifts’ but still preserve the ethical
tradition of not allowing lawyers to ‘seek’ such appointments.”).
63. See id. at 331 n.88 (citing ABA Report, supra note 58).
64. Love, supra note 55, at 445-47.
65. Id. at 445.
66. Id. Love does identify the new commentary as the source for guidance as to what counts as
“adequate information” and what balances should be applied to determine this level of information. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1 cmt. 6 (2002):
The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses
information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require
communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation,
any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client’s or other
person’s options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to
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“informed consent” and provides for both written and electronic
confirmations. This requirement can be satisfied, for the most part, by a letter
from the attorney to the client.67
In addition to adding definitions to the first section of the Model Rules,
Ethics 2000 addressed the substantive rules regarding conflicts of interest in
the area of current and former client conflicts. The commission changed the
structure of Rule 1.7 as well the commentary to the rule.68 While the
substance of the rule remains essentially unchanged,69 it now defines conflict
of interest and then distinguishes a “directly adverse” interest from one that
is only “materially limited.”70 According to the rule, a representation that
includes a conflict of interest may only be undertaken once all of the parties
have agreed to the representation through “informed consent” confirmed in
writing.71 However, certain representations that are directly adverse may still
not be consented to by the represented party.72 In this revised rule, there still
remain certain immutable duties that lawyers may not contract away.73

advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client
or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless,
a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client
or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the
information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the
client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type
involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in
giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and
generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the
consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.
Id.
67. Love, supra note 55, at 446-47. Love points out that in only three situations is the client
required to sign the consent. First, regarding contingent fees, “[a] contingent fee agreement shall be in a
writing signed by the client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2002). Second, on entering
business transactions with the client, “1.8(a)(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by
the client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(3) (2002). Finally, “[a] lawyer who represents
two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement . . . unless each client gives
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2002).
68. Love, supra note 55, at 451.
69. Id. at 451-52.
70. Id. at 452.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 453.
73. The prior rule that completely prohibited a lawyer from representing a party when a close family
member was representing the opposition has been loosened. It now provides that “ordinarily” there will be
a conflict, leaving room to allow close relatives to represent both sides of a case. Id. at 452. “[A] lawyer
related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in
a matter where that lawyer is representing another party . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7,
cmt. 11 (2002). The new comment also addresses how unforeseen circumstances should be handled by the
attorney. Love, supra note 55, at 453-54. Some commentators have pointed out that the commentary
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However, Comment [8] seems to contemplate that an attorney named as a
fiduciary creates a conflict which the lawyer can resolve by disclosure and
informed consent, confirmed in writing. In other words, it is not an immutable
conflict.
In May 2002, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility issued an opinion that gave more insight into how the ABA
would interpret the new changes to Model Rules with regard to an attorney
acting as a fiduciary. 74 It must be read together with the Ethics 2000 revisions
to yield a complete picture of the ethical norm that now applies to drafting
attorneys:
In the Committee’s opinion, a lawyer may accept appointment as a fiduciary under a will
or trust that the lawyer is preparing for the client, so long as the lawyer discusses with the
client information reasonably necessary to enable the client to make an informed decision
in selecting the fiduciary. If there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s interest in being
named a fiduciary will materially limit his independent professional judgment in advising
the client in her choice of a fiduciary, the lawyer also must obtain the client’s informed
consent, confirmed in writing. 75

The first unusual aspect of this opinion is its failure to address the new
language that allows an attorney to seek to have the lawyer named as executor.
It finesses the issue of the change in language that now allows a lawyer to seek
appointment by stating that: “When exploring the options with the client, the
lawyer may disclose his own availability to serve as a fiduciary.”76
Unfortunately, it does not directly address the new language of Comment [8]
which explicitly provides not only for disclosure of the lawyer’s availability
but also implies that actively suggesting that the lawyer be named is ethical
in every case, be it a new client or an old one.

singles out transactional representation and estate planning in particular, stating that a lawyer should “make
clear [his] relationship to the parties involved” when, for example, he is preparing documents for a husband
and wife. Id. at 454 (quoting M ODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 27 (2002)).
74. ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 45.
75. Id. at 7. Note that the committee also found that:
Because a fiduciary performs services for compensation, accepting appointment as fiduciary is not
accepting a gift from a client who is unrelated to the lawyer, such as Rule 1.8(c) prohibits. In
addition, because appointing a fiduciary is not a “business transaction with a client,” Rule 1.8(a)
does not apply to require the client to give her signed, informed consent to the essential terms of the
arrangement after receiving the lawyer’s written advice to seek independent legal advice. See Rule
1.8 cmt. 8 (“This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or
associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client’s estate or to another potentially lucrative
position.”).
Id. at 6-7.
76. Id. at 2.
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The ABA opinion also creates ambiguity about the nature of the level of
discussion or disclosure required and when it is required. Comment [8] is
structured so that the disclosure and informed consent rules (which are
embodied in Rule 1.7) only apply when the lawyer decides that her judgment
will be “materially limited.”77 Thus, it leaves a yawning gap in cases where
the lawyer decides that no such limitation exists, arguably leaving the lawyer
with no duty to disclose in such a case. On the other hand, the ABA opinion
states that under Rule 1.4(b) a lawyer has a duty to “discuss frankly with the
client her options in selecting an individual to serve as fiduciary.”78 The ABA
opinion implies that this duty extends to every representation, even if the
lawyer does not feel that Rule 1.7 applies. Thus, the two texts are inconsistent
on this point. The ABA opinion states:
When there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in
advising the client in the selection of a fiduciary will be materially limited because of the
potential amount of the fiduciary compensation or other factors, the lawyer must obtain
the client’s informed consent and confirm it in writing. 79

In other words, all cases require “discussion,” which the ABA opinion seems
to use interchangeably with disclosure, so that the lawyer’s decision that Rule
1.7 applies would only trigger an additional duty to obtain the client’s
informed consent confirmed in writing. The ABA opinion would attach a duty
of disclosure regardless of whether Rule 1.7 applies. This is clearly
inconsistent with Comment [8] which implies that only a Rule 1.7 case
triggers disclosure plus informed consent. It states that “[i]n obtaining the
client’s informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client
[as to] the nature and extent of the lawyer’s financial interest in the
appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the
position.”80 This construction clearly links the disclosure to the obtaining of
informed consent for the conflict, which implies that the duty of disclosure is
only triggered when Rule 1.7 is deemed to apply. Thus, it would not apply in
all cases.
In contrast, the ABA opinion indicates that the lawyer is bound by Rule
1.4(b) in all cases to discuss (read “disclose”):

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 3 n.9.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8, cmt. 8 (2002).
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frankly with the client her options in selecting an individual to serve as [a] fiduciary.
[The] discussion should cover information reasonably adequate to permit the client to
understand the tasks to be performed by the fiduciary; the fiduciary’s desired skills; the
kinds of individuals or entities likely to serve most effectively, such as professionals,
corporate fiduciaries, and family members; and the benefits and detriments of using each,
including relative costs.81

At least the nature of the disclosure, though not when it is required, is
essentially the same in both texts.
Finally, the ABA opinion states that because a fiduciary performs services
for compensation, accepting appointment as a fiduciary is not a “business
transaction” with a client.82 Thus, it does not trigger the heightened
requirements of Rule 1.8(a) which, in addition to disclosure and informed
consent confirmed in writing, would require the client to sign a consent after
being informed by the lawyer that she should seek independent legal advice
about the matter.83 This differs from a Rule 1.7 conflict, which only requires
a communication to the client from the lawyer under the “informed consent,
confirmed in writing” provision.84 Rule 1.8(a) would also require a client’s
signature, a lawyer to advise the client that it would be advisable to consult
another lawyer before waiving the conflict, and that the client has a reasonable
opportunity to do so.85
Read together, Comment [8] to Rule 1.8(c) and the ABA opinion yield
ambiguity at best and contradiction at worst. The Model Rules should be
revised to better comport with the fiduciary view of the attorney-client
relationship, providing that a lawyer may accept an appointment but not that
she may seek one. The trigger for disclosure under Comment [8] should not
be a discretionary decision by the attorney that Rule 1.7 applies, and the entire
situation should be the subject of a free-standing rule—not an adjunct to
another rule which deals with a related, but distinct, situation: gifts to drafting
attorneys.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 45, at 2.
Id. at 3.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2002).
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR AN ETHICAL RULE THAT BALANCES EFFICIENCY WITH
FAIRNESS
If the ABA were to revisit the provisions governing attorneys as
fiduciaries, the drafters should consider the following factors in redrafting the
ethical rule in this area. They should recognize that their view of the nature
of the attorney-client relationship drives the choice of an ethical rule. At the
most conceptual level, they would be faced with the decision as to whether
allowing an unregulated relationship, adopting a disclosure model, or
prohibiting the relationship altogether is the most intellectually consistent
approach to resolving the financial conflicts of interest that arise in the
drafting attorney being named as the client’s fiduciary in the context of estate
planning.
In addition, ethical codes are meant to enforce professional norms and
avoid harm to clients or patients. The drafters would have to consider the
specific harms to be concerned with in the lawyer/fiduciary context, including
impinging on client autonomy (and balancing that risk with the preservation
of clients’ freedom to contract with a fiduciary of their choice). The harms
also include the reputational cost to the legal profession as a whole imposed
by systemic failures to protect individual clients by lawyers who ignore
conflicts of interest. These risks of harm might arguably be minimized by
incorporating disclosure and informed consent as elements of that model, but
such measures may not reduce the risks sufficiently to comport with the view
of the protections that a fiduciary relationship should entail. An absolute
prohibition model may be the only model conceptually consistent with the
traditional view of a lawyer as general fiduciary, but it comes at great social
cost, given the lack of corporate fiduciaries available to the average American.
If the drafters were to conclude that encouraging drafting attorneys to act
as fiduciaries in appropriate cases should be a goal, they would then have to
consider whether the rule facilitates such contracts. In addition to the
normative or moral function, ethics codes have economic implications, and the
drafters should consider whether a rule reduces the agency costs involved in
hiring a lawyer as a fiduciary. If one believes that facilitating lawyers as
fiduciaries is a worthy goal, given the lack of alternatives for many clients,
then the rule should be both fair (to reflect the fiduciary nature of the
relationship) and efficient (so that clients will be encouraged to select
lawyers).
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A. Is the Post-Ethics 2000 Norm Efficient?
The question posed by many law and economics scholars is how to
fashion default rules that minimize agency costs.86 These agency costs include
the costs of monitoring the agent to make sure that she behaves in a manner
aligned with the interests of the principal. Ethical rules should encourage
bonding mechanisms to minimize the agency costs in this regard.87 Penalties
for lawyers who fail to disclose are one way to encourage such alignment of
interest. The following sections propose an ethical rule that makes such
penalties predictable and consistent.
In his article, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure,88
Professor Larry Ribstein describes those agency costs and argues that one
function of ethical rules is to reduce those costs which are inherent in the
attorney-client relationship:
Ethical rules are a form of professional self-regulation enforced by civil liability or
professional discipline. An important, though not the only, function of ethical rules is
reducing agency costs between lawyers and clients. . . . Agency costs typically involve
conflicts between the agent’s and principal’s interests. The conflicts arise because the
agent has the power to control the principal’s affairs but does not fully bear the risks and
rewards associated with this control. Agency costs are potentially significant in legal
representation because the client delegates significant discretion to the lawyer but incurs
high monitoring costs because of the specialized and idiosyncratic nature of professional
work. . . . Such conflicts often involve shirking—that is, a failure to invest the amount
of time and other resources representing clients necessary to maximize the interests of
both lawyers and clients. . . . Lawyers’ sensitivity to risk also may give them an incentive
to reduce risk by doing more work than the client needs. Lawyers’ and clients’ interests
may conflict more subtly than in other types of relationships because lawyers can shape
their clients’ demand for legal services. A client goes to a lawyer not merely to buy
particular services, but also to buy the lawyer’s expertise in deciding what must be done
in performing a general task (such as litigation). Lawyers may use their discretion to
cause the client to buy more services than the client would buy if the client made the
decision with full information.89

The post-Ethics 2000 norm suffers from this problem if the language of
Comment [8] is invoked. Thus, in some cases the lawyer does not have to

86. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The Politics of Privatizing Business Bankruptcy Law, 74 AM .
BANKR. L.J. 77 (2000) (analyzing bankruptcy law as a form of default rule that may be opted out of in an
effort to reduce social costs).
87. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV .
1089, 1129-30 (1981).
88. Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV . 1707
(1998).
89. Id. at 1708-10.
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provide the kind of disclosure that would yield a client on the other side of the
transaction who has full information. Full information is essential to an
efficient market,90 and an ethical rule that fails to yield such full information
is less than efficient.
Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller in their article, An
Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation,91 also embrace an
agency model of the attorney-client relationship in evaluating the efficiency
of ethical rules governing conflicts of interest. The financial compensation
attached to the services certainly militates for a description of the relationship
as that of an agency contract.92 As Macey and Miller note:
The concept of legal “ethics” is deeply embedded in the notion of law as a learned
profession. Lawyers are expected to behave in accordance with a high standard of
morality. . . . [It] carries [with it] a powerful normative connotation; it suggests that legal
ethics has a large moral component and might in fact be seen as an applied branch of
moral philosophy. Consistent with this normative thrust, the system of legal ethics is
often understood as a moral code for the legal profession.93 Yet there is an undeniably
powerful economic element in legal ethics rules as well. . . . Thus, while ethical rules
undoubtedly have a moral component, they also have an economic function.94

Macey and Miller posit that the profession has an interest in creating efficient
default rules to regulate conflicts of interest, because it increases profits for
lawyers; the public has a similar incentive, because it reduces the cost of
contracting for legal services.95 They argue that economic theory predicts that

90. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the
Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK . L. REV . 583, 611 n.98 (2004)
(citing William H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 ACCT. REV . 23, 27 (1981)); Maria O’Brien Hylton,
“Socially Responsible” Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM . U.
L. REV . 1 (1992).
91. Macey & Miller, supra note 44. Note that Macey and Miller focused on the conflict inherent
in representing multiple clients. This article deals with a different conflict: the financial conflict inherent
in the drafting attorney naming herself as fiduciary and the consequent impairment of independent advice
that may result.
92. In this country, fiduciaries generally do their work in exchange for monetary compensation, but,
in some other countries, this is not necessarily the norm. Historically, fiduciaries were not entitled to
compensation for their services. As a comparative law matter, in England, the common law concept of a
fiduciary as a person in whom a testator could “impose a purely conscientious obligation, a precatory, moral
duty, to confer a benefit upon a third party” still exists. Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., A Matter of Ethics Ignored:
The Attorney—Draftsman as Testamentary Fiduciary, 36 U. KAN . L. REV . 275, 305 (1988).
93. Macey & Miller, supra note 44, at 965 & n.1 (citing David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse:
A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 MD . L. REV . 451, 455-59 (1981); Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 231, 231 (1979)).
94. Id. at 965-66.
95. Id. at 965.

432

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:411

there is a threshold of harm to the client, below which the attorney should be
allowed to represent another party without obtaining the first client’s
consent.96 Thus, in evaluating the post-Ethics 2000 norm, one might argue
that the harms to the client in those cases where the lawyer’s interest would
not materially limit her ability to render independent advice (in other words
the cases under Comment [8] that appear not to require disclosure) are fairly
minimal. Hence, the rule operates in an efficient manner, since it does not
require disclosure (or informed consent) in a class of cases that would not
yield significant harm to the client. However, why the lawyer’s decision that
her interest is not materially limited has any link as to how much harm a client
suffers in these cases is not at all clear. One can envision a case where the
lawyer feels that her long relationship with the client is enough to prevent
such material limitation, but that has little connection to the harms listed
above including limiting client autonomy and the risk of overreaching by
lawyers who are in a position to have significant information about, and
influence over, an elderly client.
Macey and Miller wrote their article prior to the Ethics 2000 changes.
After those changes were enacted, several scholars examined the new Ethics
2000 commentary’s more-accepting view of contractual waivers of conflicts.97
In his article, Advance Waiver of Conflicts,98 Professor Richard Painter
distinguishes between immutable rules and default rules in the context of the
profession’s ethical rules governing conflicts of interest. His article provides
a useful framework in which to evaluate the financial conflict of interest
inherent in drafting attorneys naming themselves as fiduciaries:
Contractarian economics distinguishes immutable rules from default rules. An
immutable rule is a rule that cannot be changed by a contractual agreement. A

96. Id. But see Steven Lubet, There Are No Scriveners Here, 84 IOWA L. REV . 341 (1999), which
states:
It was therefore disheartening to see two prominent legal scholars, Jonathan Macey of Cornell and
Geoffrey Miller of New York University, endorse the very course of action that has brought so much
unnecessary grief to so many lawyers and clients. Writing in a recent issue of the Iowa Law Review,
Professors Macey and Miller assert that client consent may be unnecessary when a single lawyer
represents several negotiating parties whose goals are in “substantial alignment,” especially when
the attorney is acting as a mere scrivener. This conclusion is normatively wrong and positively
dangerous to practicing lawyers.
Id. at 341-42.
97. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, All’s O.K. Between Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule on
Privacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV . 701 (2001); Jonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice
by Consenting Adults: Prospective Conflict Waivers as a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship—A
Response to Mr. Fox, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV . 971 (2001).
98. Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO . J. LEGAL ETHICS 289 (2000).
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majoritarian immutable rule is suitable for most parties in most situations, whereas a
tailored immutable rule is designed for a specific subset of parties. A default rule, unlike
an immutable rule, can be changed by a contractual arrangement. Because lawyers are
fiduciaries for their clients, courts and bar associations are wary of making some rules of
professional responsibility default rules instead of immutable rules. Under the Model
Rules, for example, lawyers cannot get client permission to commingle client funds with
their own [or] put themselves in a client’s will unless they are related to the client. On
the other hand, there are some situations in which lawyers and clients are allowed to
contract around rules of professional responsibility. Rules governing client conflicts are
a salient example; a client sometimes may consent to a conflicting representation.99

Painter goes on to define what he calls majoritarian default rules and
penalty default rules, with the majoritarian rule reflecting the rule most parties
would prefer.100 He notes that parties who do not like the rule will bargain
around it, unless the bargaining costs are too high.101 In the latter case, they
will stay with the default rule, although it is suboptimal.102 The argument for
adopting a majoritarian rule is that it minimizes transaction costs. Few people
will opt out of the default.
Penalty default rules are quite different. They, in fact, do not reflect what
most parties would want.103 As such, they arguably increase transaction costs.
However, the rationale for adopting penalty default rules is that it will both
encourage parties to negotiate for a tailored solution or rule and encourage
lawyers to disclose conflicts.104 Painter’s analysis focuses on the advance
waiver of conflicts that involve representing multiple parties rather than
financial conflicts. But much of his analysis is applicable to both kinds of
conflicts. In particular, his observation that “ex-ante contracting is complete[]
before most relevant facts [are] known”105 is true for the client who selects the
drafting attorney as his fiduciary. In allowing the lawyer to serve, the client
is granting his consent to not only the financial conflict that arguably impairs
the lawyer’s ability to give independent advice but also to future conflicts in
terms of the lawyer’s choice of counsel for the estate and the fiduciary’s
loyalty to the estate and beneficiaries. Painter notes that, in the corporate
context, scholars have long debated:

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 289-90 (citations omitted).
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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whether fiduciary principles or contract should control when the two conflict, and
criticism of contract focuses on information asymmetry. . . . Critics of the primacy of
contract also point out that designing contract terms is difficult when future outcomes are
difficult to compute. In recent years ex-ante contracts have been allowed to trump
fiduciary . . . but there are [some] limits, and many issues . . . are resolved ex post.106

Are conflicts rules majoritarian or penalty default rules? Painter argues that
while others have characterized them as the majoritarian rules that most
clients would prefer, there is an alternative argument for a penalty rules
label.107 He cites the rules that prohibit lawyers in transactional practice from
“representing clients with adverse interests, even in unrelated matters.”108
Lawyers frequently obtain permission to do just this and this suggests that
most parties would prefer a rule which allows such representation. But,
Model Rule 1.7 is structured like a penalty default rule in that it prohibits the
waiver of a conflict unless informed consent, confirmed in writing, is
obtained. The point of a penalty default rule here is to acknowledge “the
information asymmetry between lawyer and client by forcing the lawyer to
disclose relevant information about both representations before the client
consents.”109 And, such penalty rules impose social costs when the barriers
to lawyer and client contracting around them are high. They tend to be
overbroad and provide an incentive for lawyers not to represent clients and
“prevent lawyer-client relationships from being formed in the first place.”110
The current Comment [8], to the degree that it does not require mandatory
disclosure in all cases, is arguably more efficient and better facilitates lawyers
as fiduciaries. For example, the requirement that client consent be given
“after consultation,” (an immutable aspect of some penalty default rules in the
Model Rules) introduces an ex-post risk into the equation. “The possibility
that courts might disqualify a lawyer by applying these immutable standards

106. Id. at 290-91 (references omitted). In fact, “[i]n the lawyer-client context also, contract and
fiduciary principals clash if the client is contracting at a time when she does not know many of the relevant
facts.” Id. at 291. This is the reason, Painter argues, that many default rules in the ethical rules that govern
lawyers contemplate ex-post contracting:
The words “consent after consultation” appear regularly in professional responsibility codes and
suggest that a consenting client should know all or most of the relevant facts before consent is
obtained. . . . [T]here are circumstances in which lawyers and clients both benefit from ex-ante
contracting over a future contingency [e.g.] agreeing ex-ante on how the lawyer will handle a
problem such as conflicts of interest within an organizational client or client fraud.
Id. at 291-92 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 293.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 294-95.
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ex-post forces lawyers to carefully explain potential conflicts to their clients
before obtaining consent, and sometimes to withdraw from a representation
when circumstances change, even if consent has been obtained.”111 Note that
ex-post review of an executor or trustee’s appointment may give rise to
disqualification as well if she has not conformed to the ethical stricture
regarding disclosure.112 As Painter points out, courts have been unpredictable
in their ex-post review of ex-ante waivers of conflicts.113 This lack of
predictability tends to increase the cost of the rule.114 One might well argue
that Comment [8], in building in discretion on the part of the lawyer to choose
whether Rule 1.7 applies, will invite more such ex-post review and, thus, is
more costly than a rule which mandates disclosure in every case.
Painter asks whether it matters what the default rule is if the system
chooses a default rule rather than an immutable rule.115 If people are going to
contract around it anyway, why should the substance of the rule be of
concern? Invoking Ronald Coase, Painter notes that if one assumes rational
actors, perfect information and no transaction costs, then the Coase theorem

111. Id. at 294.
112. See In re Estate of Peterson, 565 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
113. Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) (determining that advance
waiver may not always be revoked due to reliance of the other parties upon the agreement; however, the
court did not broadly permit advance waiver, but instead narrowed the field to “long-standing” consent
combined with detrimental reliance of the other party); Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5
F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (refusing to draw a distinction between a sophisticated client and an
unsophisticated client and indicating the attorney had not sufficiently informed the client; therefore, the
court struck the advance waiver of conflicts); Fisons Corp. v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1080
(JMC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15284 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1990) (finding that a response letter to an
attorney affirmatively acknowledging the situation demonstrated informed consent and advance waiver);
Interstate Props. v. Pyramid Co., 547 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that informed consent had
been given and advance waiver provided by the Pyramid Company); Elliott v. McFarland Unified Sch.
Dist., 211 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding an advance waiver); Painter, supra note 98,
at 297-308 (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1978))
(upholding advance waiver of conflicts of interest).
114. Painter, supra note 98, at 309-10. Painter also compares the ABA Model Rules regarding
conflicts of interest to the ALI’s approach in the R ESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS. He
concludes that the Model Rules are becoming increasingly like the Restatement’s more flexible approach.
The Restatement relies upon “a list of criteria for determining whether advance consent is enforceable: the
client’s sophistication, the client’s opportunity to obtain independent advice of counsel, and the client’s
familiarity with the type of conflict waived.” Id. at 309. In fact, that is exactly what the profession needs
to look at when it comes to attorneys acting as fiduciaries. The Restatement’s approach would lead one to
conclude that most clients in the estate planning context are unsophisticated, have little chance to obtain
independent advice and are unfamiliar with the nature of the conflict waived because they have little if any
knowledge of what executors and trustees do. Thus, one might argue that the Restatement approach would
tend to support the argument that such waivers are not appropriate.
115. Painter, supra note 98, at 292.
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would hold that it really does not matter.116 But, in the real world, there are
transaction costs and lawyers and their clients may possess a “cognitive bias”
against contracting around a default rule. Thus, penalty default rules in
particular impose social costs because the contracting parties adhere to a
suboptimal default rule.117
The new ABA opinion on the subject takes great pains to note that
“appointing a fiduciary is not a ‘business transaction with a client,’ [thus]
Rule 1.8(a) does not apply to require the client to give her signed, informed
consent to the essential terms of the arrangement after receiving the lawyer’s
written advice to seek independent legal advice . . . .”118 Note that there is a
real question about whether such penalty default rules as those included in
Rule 1.8(a) should in fact be adopted in the context of a drafting attorney
“seeking” the financially lucrative role of executor or trustee. (The Georgia
Supreme Court analogizes the two in its formal advisory opinion and sees the
attorney’s financial interest in the executor fee as akin to the kind of financial
interest in the transaction that should trigger disclosure.119 ) These provisions’
“signed, informed consent to the essential terms of the arrangement after
receiving the lawyer’s written advice to seek independent legal advice”120
reflect a higher level of informed consent, and the imposition of a mandate to
suggest that the client seek independent legal advice would clearly discourage
such arrangements and, thus, be less efficient. The many costs to the client
from seeking another lawyer’s opinion are high and unlikely to be warranted
in many cases. It would be a suboptimal rule in that sense.
B. Is the Post-Ethics 2000 Norm Fair?
If the drafters of the Model Rules view the attorney-client relationship
more as a fiduciary relationship and less as a purely contractual one, it is
arguable that it is conceptually inconsistent to allow certain conflicts to be
waived. If one looks at the attorney-client relationship against the backdrop
of immutable fiduciary duties that exist apart from those negotiated and
imposed by the rules of ethics and common law rules regarding attorney and
client, one might reasonably conclude that lawyers should not be allowed to
resolve certain conflicts at all, even by disclosing and receiving informed

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 45, at 2-3.
See infra Appendix for the full text of this opinion, FAO 91-1.
ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 45, at 3.
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consent from the client. One might argue that such conflicts are so inherent
that it is a “logical fallacy” to conclude that duties like the duty of loyalty may
be waived by “informed” consent on the part of the client.121 Many would
argue that such an approach is antithetical to the very idea of a fiduciary
relationship.122 However, the drafters may conclude that the social cost of
prohibiting these relationships is too high and that mandatory disclosure will
alleviate the risk of harm inherent in the conflict.
There is an argument that mandatory disclosure resolves the information
asymmetry problem and provides the client with full information. This not
only enhances efficiency, as noted above, it also comports with social norms
in terms of fairness to the client and is consistent with the fiduciary duty of
loyalty. Comment [8] falls short of this goal by failing to require disclosure
in every case. The ABA opinion does better in this regard by at least implying
that “discussion” if not “disclosure” is required in all cases.
Lawyers are often the most appropriate choice for clients selecting a
personal representative or trustee. Elderly clients often have long
relationships with, and great confidence in, their lawyers. In an increasingly
mobile society, clients may have tenuous connections at best to their children
or siblings in other parts of the country. Lawyers who are trained in the scope
of fiduciary responsibilities in law school and who are constrained by ethical
rules and malpractice concerns are arguably better fiduciaries than banks or
family members. The disclosure provided for in both Comment [8] and the
ABA opinion provide the appropriate level of information for the client,
including the alternatives to the lawyer as fiduciary and the lawyer’s financial
interest in the appointment. The language of the ABA opinion is better in that
it more clearly fleshes out what the nature of the risks of conflict are and it
also provides that a drafting attorney should explain to the client that she will
be faced with the odd prospect of hiring a lawyer for the estate. Such a choice
is obviously another of the ethical pitfalls. This posits that a lawyer/fiduciary
can really make a detached judgment about who is the best lawyer to represent
the fiduciary. The lawyer is unlikely to hire another lawyer or someone

121. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health
Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV . 1701 (1999).
122. See id. at 1757-64. Sage summarizes this point well in the health care context when he notes
“[r]egulating fiduciary obligations through disclosure therefore presents a logical fallacy. To the extent that
the fiduciary obligation between physician and patient arises from a relationship of dependence, not from
an express contractual agreement, physicians’ duty of loyalty arguably should not be waivable upon
disclosure.” Id. at 1759. This author grappled with this issue in a prior article and finally rejected a model
that would prohibit lawyers from acting as fiduciaries and embraced a disclosure model. See Monopoli,
supra note 46.
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outside her firm. In this dual role, the issue of being paid both executor’s fees
and legal fees raises another ethical issue that should be disclosed to the
client. Many clients are under the impression that the lawyer will do the legal
work for free if named as the executor and many lawyers will discount their
fees (thus making them efficient choices for many clients). These issues
should be clarified under any new rule.
Disclosure of course is not a panacea. Many elderly clients will not be
able to absorb this information, and informed consent may not be truly
informed. However, the alternative is generally an immutable rule that
prohibits lawyers from acting as fiduciaries, and the social costs of such a rule
are very high. In other words, one might argue that the benefits of the
absolute prohibition model are outweighed by the costs to the public of not
having enough well-trained fiduciaries to assist them.123
In fashioning a balanced rule, the drafters should consider that the
drafting attorney conflict is pervasive and the risk of breach of the duty of
loyalty and opportunistic behavior, as in any agency contract, is high. The
situation is replete with “serious problems of conflict of interest, overreaching,
undue influence, and solicitation.”124 Comment [8] in the post-Ethics 2000
norm also fails to provide that a “lawyer must advise the client,” rather than
“should” do so, and that an attorney who drafts an instrument that names him
or her as a fiduciary constitutes a per se conflict.125 This failure may reflect
a much more arm’s-length or contractarian view of the attorney-client
relationship. The client beware—he must acquaint himself to a large extent
with the inherent ethical problems replete in such appointments—solicitation,
conflicts of interest in terms of impaired independent judgment, overreaching,
and undue influence—all of which are implicated by the financial benefit to
the drafting attorney of being named fiduciary. 126 As such, the post-Ethics

123. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, supra note 49, at 1383 & n.129 (citing Leonard Levin, Legal
Ramifications of Unethical Estate Planning Practices, TR . & EST . 50 (1985), for the proposition that an
absolute prohibition would also cause “serious disruption to the legitimate expectations of [the] client[ ]”).
124. DeFuria, supra note 92, at 299. For an extensive analysis of why a drafting attorney naming
himself or herself as fiduciary in the instrument raises all of these issues, see id. at 300-06. See also Gerald
P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices—Is Good Business Bad Ethics?,
45 OHIO ST . L.J. 57, 86-101 (1984) (laying out the argument in favor of an absolute prohibition model that
would bar drafting attorneys from naming themselves as fiduciaries).
125. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (The ABA Committee
that issues opinions on ethical issues) did not take the position that naming oneself as a fiduciary is a per
se conflict that requires disclosure and waiver of the conflict by informed consent of the client. See ABA
Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 45.
126. See Monopoli, supra note 46, at 334 n.98 (“As a comparative law matter, in England, the
common law concept of a fiduciary as a person in whom a testator could ‘impose a purely conscientious
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2000 norm is less than fair or less than consistent with a fiduciary view of the
attorney-client relationship and the information asymmetry therein.
C. A Rule that Facilitates Lawyers as Fiduciaries and that Balances
Efficiency and Fairness
The trend expressed in the Ethics 2000 revisions in this area suggests a
move away from client protection and toward a more arm’s-length view of the
attorney-client relationship—from a fiduciary to a contractarian view of the
relationship. Under Comment [8], if a lawyer may now seek appointment as
a fiduciary, that suggests that the impairment of her independent judgment and
advice to the client as to who may be best candidate for the role of fiduciary
is of far less concern to the profession as an ethical matter. Giving her an
option to decide for herself whether this situation raises a conflict which can
then be resolved simply by disclosure also suggests a move away from the
notion that the relationship of lawyer and client has certain immutable duties
that may not be waived.
In fashioning a new rule that reflects the fiduciary nature of the
relationship, the drafters should provide that this kind of conflict is a per se
conflict. The very financial benefit conferred poses a risk to the independent
advice of the attorney, and the decision as to whether there is a conflict under
Rule 1.7 should not be discretionary. Admittedly, this would be a revision
that is counter to the Ethics 2000 Commission’s move toward a more
contractarian view of conflicts rules, the trend reflected in the broader changes
made by Ethics 2000.127 However, it would be a necessary element of any

obligation, a precatory, moral duty, to confer a benefit upon a third party’ still exists.”) See also DeFuria,
supra note 92, at 305. DeFuria stated:
Under normal circumstances, a testamentary fiduciary [in England] is not entitled to remuneration
for his services . . . [and this] rule [extends] to solicitors acting as estate fiduciaries, who are only
entitled to out-of-pocket expenses. . . . The reason for the rule is to prevent the inherent conflict of
interest and self-dealing that inevitably results whenever a fiduciary profits from his trust. . . .
Because of this, the English cases reason that a fiduciary may not be compensated for his time and
trouble. However, if the testator specifically directs in his will that the fiduciary is to receive
compensation, payment will be permitted. . . . Since it would be improper for an attorney to suggest
that his client include a fee payment clause in the will, and since it takes an affirmative act on the
part of the client to authorize a fiduciary’s fee, the English rule [would] appear[ ] to reduce
somewhat the potential for impropriety whenever an attorney drafts a will that names himself as a
testamentary fiduciary.
Id. at 305 n.159; see also Earl of Perth v. Fitzalan-Howard, [1982] Ch. 61 (Eng. C.A.) (allowing the court
to use its inherent jurisdiction to impose higher fiduciary’s fees than originally provided in a trust).
127. See Love, supra note 55. As Professor Margaret Love notes in her article on the Ethics 2000
revisions, part of the impetus for the project was the adoption of the Restatement of the Law Governing
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revised rule if the rule were to adequately protect the client and reflect the
fiduciary view of the relationship.
Attorneys, faced with changing economic conditions, naturally attempt
to reformulate the ethical constructs within which they practice in order to
stay economically viable in the face of competing service providers.128 Some
authors have proposed a sophisticated client exception for conflicts rules to
enhance efficiency and to allow lawyers to better compete with other
professions, like accountants.129 In considering a new rule, the drafters of the
Model Rules might find such an exception appealing, but it fails to help
resolve the particular conflict issue inherent in drafting attorneys naming
themselves as fiduciaries. Virtually all estate-planning clients are arguably
unsophisticated. Thus, creating a sophisticated client exception, while it
might make a new rule more efficient, would contravene the goal of

Lawyers by the American Law Institute (ALI) and certain inconsistencies in the Model Rules. Id. at 442.
One of the issues that Ethics 2000 faced was the growing need to clarify the concepts surrounding conflicts
of interest. Id. In the end, Ethics 2000 revised many of the rules regarding current and former client
conflicts of interest, and the rules regarding transactions that a lawyer may make with her client, making
it easier for lawyers to engage in such transactions:
R. 1.8(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: (1) the
transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by
the client; (2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking . . . independent legal
counsel on the transaction; and (3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the
client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including
whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2002). The risks attendant in such business transactions are
described more thoroughly in the new commentary than in the prior version. Love, supra note 55, at
458-59; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 3 (2002) (“In some cases, the lawyer’s interest may
be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client’s consent to the transaction.”). The
rules now permit participation in transactions with clients, provided informed consent is obtained in
writing. In other words, they have been transformed from immutable rules into penalty default rules.
However, there are still some transactions that will be barred by Rule 1.7 (current client conflict) even
though the client may give her consent in writing. Love, supra note 55, at 458-59. For example, the new
rules would still bar the acquisition by an attorney of an interest in the litigation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client . . . .”). See also James E. Moliterno, Broad
Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The “Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation”
Rules, 16 GEO . J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 256-57 (2003).
128. Audrey I. Benison, Note, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the Reconciliation of
Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO . J. LEGAL ETHICS 699, 699 (2000).
In her article, Benison argues that although clients demand lawyers who are loyal, clients also seek out less
expensive means of providing the same services. Benison argues that a “sophisticated client” exception
should be provided in the conflicts of interest rules to allow for less expensive legal services.
129. Id.
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incorporating a fiduciary approach. Such an exception might reduce the
number of clients who are dissuaded from using attorneys as fiduciaries, given
the lack of disclosure, and it thus might be more efficient in the sense that
more of these relationships will be formed, one goal of efficient ethical norms.
However, if those relationships turn out to yield a high percentage of unethical
lawyers who fail to provide quality services or actually embezzle estate or
trust funds, then in the long-run fewer such contracts will be formed, assuming
perfect information flows in the market and the reputational bonding the
default rules assume fails to materialize.130
Note that lawyer-client relationships are akin to consumer contracts, since
many clients (other than perhaps large corporate clients) are analogous to
consumers who purchase services. And, while good faith can be equated to
honesty in the contractual process, as Professor Scott FitzGibbon notes,
fiduciary duties are more closely related to a more complete disclosure on the
part of the one bargaining party, the lawyer/fiduciary.131 Several states require
such disclosure.132 Of these, the Georgia model provides a comprehensive

130. If one thinks of the initial contract for legal services as being subject to contract law as well as
ethical strictures, one must consider the impact of contract law on the performance of those services. If a
lawyer provides less than independent advice about who the best fiduciary would be, she is arguably in
breach of the good faith requirements implicit in contract law. In contract law, there is an implicit duty of
good faith and fair dealing between contracting parties. One court stated: “Where fairness and justice
require, the court may impose upon a contract a duty required to effectuate the implicit covenant of good
faith and fair dealing necessarily involved in the parties’ contractual relationship.” Einhorn v. Ceran Corp.,
426 A.2d 1076, 1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980). The concept is thus quite broad and is often used
as an equitable remedy to correct injustices that the court perceives in a contractual relationship.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 comment “a” states that “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement
of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad
faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). The case that best describes the concept of
unconscionability is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The
Williams decision stated that “[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH , CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 311 (3d ed. 1999) (quoting
Williams, 350 F.2d at 449). However, good faith and unconscionability standing alone would not provide
the same level of protection as the imposition of the higher level of duties of lawyer as fiduciary. Some
would argue that the distinction is one without a difference, but, for purposes of this article, it will be
assumed that the latter is substantively different from the former.
131. Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV . 303, 325
(1999).
132. See ABA Formal Op. 02-426, supra note 45, at 2 n.6:
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal
Op. 96-36 (March 5, 1996) (Under Rule 1.4(b), “when a client asks a lawyer to draft a trust naming
that lawyer (or that lawyer’s partner or associate) as trustee, the lawyer must advise the client of the
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approach and provides an efficient and predictable means of disclosure in the
form of a standard consent form. However, its implementation by the court
in a recent case illustrates how difficult it may be to achieve such an optimal
balance in this area, even with a well-crafted rule.
D. The Georgia Model
In a decision ironically handed down the same month and year as the
ABA’s advisory opinion, the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed the ethical
norm set out by that court in its 1991 formal advisory opinion on the issue.133
That model is preferable to the post-Ethics 2000 norm that exists under the
Model Rules and the ABA opinion today in terms of fashioning an ethical rule
that balances fairness and efficiency while preserving client autonomy. In
Estate of Peterson,134 the court upheld a disqualification of an attorney from
serving as executor of a will even though he made full disclosure. He had
failed to give written notice to or obtain written consent from his client.135
The act of naming oneself as executor implicated Standard 30, which involved
the potential for impaired independent judgment given the possible financial
gain.136
Lawyer Robert Lanyon drafted and was named in a client’s will as the
successor executor. The client’s wife was to have been the initial executor but
she predeceased the client.137 The decedent’s heirs challenged the lawyer’s

duties of a trustee, the lawyer’s ability to perform those duties, the availability and ability of others
to perform those duties, the compensation payable to a trustee, and the potential for conflicts of
interest, as well as any other factors relevant to the particular circumstances of the client.”).
See also id. at 2 n.11:
See, e.g., N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 2307-a (2002) (testator to be informed, prior to execution of
will naming as executor the lawyer drafting the will or a lawyer affiliated with him that, subject to
limited statutory exceptions, any person, including a lawyer, is eligible to serve as executor; that
absent any contrary agreement, any person including a lawyer who serves as executor is entitled to
receive an executor’s statutory commissions; and that if the lawyer-executor or a lawyer affiliated
with him renders legal services for the executor, the lawyer rendering the services is entitled to
receive just and reasonable compensation for the legal services in addition to statutory fiduciary’s
commissions); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6103.6 (West 2002) (stating that a lawyer who drafted
instrument serving as sole trustee may be removed unless the instrument was reviewed by an
independent lawyer who counsels the testator or settlor and provides a “certificate of independent
review”).
133. See infra Appendix.
134. In re Estate of Peterson, 565 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
135. Id. at 525-26.
136. Id. at 524.
137. Id.
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appointment on the grounds that he had a conflict of interest. While the court
found that Lanyon did not promote himself or consciously influence his
client’s decision to name him as executor, and that Lanyon fully disclosed
orally to his client the potential conflicts, he failed to obtain the client’s
consent in writing or to give the client the kind of written notice required by
the Georgia Supreme Court in Formal Advisory Opinion 91-1. Lanyon argued
that his client’s execution of the will naming Lanyon as the executor
constituted the kind of notice sufficient to meet the requirements of FAO 91-1.
The court disagreed, stating:
Considering FAO 91-1 as a whole, and particularly in light of the opinion’s provision
that “[a]n attorney’s full disclosure is essential to the client’s informed decision and
consent,” we conclude that . . . the required writing must at least acknowledge the
disclosure essential to an informed decision and consent.138

Note that Estate of Peterson arguably echoes the Macey and Miller
position that a de minimus exception to disclosure and informed consent in the
area of multiple representation is the best rule. If the Georgia model had
included such a de minimus exception when the risk of harm to the client was
small, the attorney might well have been allowed to continue as executor. The
de minimus exception in this case would not be with regard to the disclosure
itself, but merely to the requirement that the notice to or consent from the
client be in writing. The risks here were minimal—the attorney was not even
the initial fiduciary and the court found that he orally disclosed to the testator.
By disqualifying the attorney, one could argue that testator’s intent was
defeated here.139 However, doctrinal rules often defeat a testator’s intent and
supporters of a rigid rule might well argue that a small number of such
outcomes is worth the increased protection for most unsophisticated
testators.140 One could argue that a rigid rule is easier to apply as a systemic

138. Id. at 525-26.
139. Freedom of testation and testator’s intent are frequently identified as paramount jurisprudential
touchstones in the area of trusts and estates. For example, in writing about this area of the law, scholars
note that “[t]he organizing principle of Anglo-American law is freedom of disposition: the donor’s
intention is given effect except to the extent that it contravenes public policy.” Lawrence W. Waggoner,
The Uniform Probate Code’s Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 2
(2003). See also Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV . 199, 209
(2001) (“Donative freedom is a principal value in the American system of inheritance.”). These scholars
have then gone on to explore the accuracy and the wisdom of those doctrinal touchstones.
140. Note that although many of the cases identify the importance of freedom of testation and
effectuating testators’ intent, some scholars have correctly noted that:
[o]ur property law system reinforces the classical liberal conception of rights as instruments for
promoting individual autonomy. The cloak of private law, along with the traditional view that a
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matter, is more predictable and is more administratively efficient. However,
rigid application of the rules may well lead to results that defeat testator’s
intent.
The court’s application of the rule was very strict. They might have
chosen to exercise some flexibility, since it appears there was little risk to
client autonomy or risk of fraud in the Peterson case. Strict application by a
court is always a cost that must be factored into the process of rule selection
and their effect on outcomes. In the end, concerns about fairness have to be
balanced with concerns about efficiency, with the former perhaps proving to
be the more important (though costly) value to facilitate by ethical norm.
There is another interesting aspect of the Georgia Rule. Unlike the ABA
opinion, it assumes that the financial interest in the fee is, in fact, the
equivalent of other kinds of financial interests that would impair a lawyer’s
independent judgment. Under the ABA opinion, accepting appointment as a
fiduciary is not considered to be a “business transaction” with a client that
would trigger higher levels of informed consent, that is, a signed writing by
the client.141
The Georgia Model also reiterates the old EC 5-6 when it states that, “It
is not ethically improper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee in a will
or trust he or she has prepared when the lawyer does not consciously influence
the client in the decision . . . .”142 Ethics 2000 should also have reincorporated this very clear guidance, dropped from the 1983 Model Rules.
The Georgia Model also provides for a standard, “off the rack” disclosure
form to be provided to the client in all cases.143 This is the most efficient and
predictable way to make sure that full disclosure and informed consent has
been obtained, given the nature of the conflict of interest and the transactional
information asymmetry.
When states consider adopting the Ethics 2000 changes to the Model
Rules and when the drafters of the Model Rules revisit them, they should

donative transfer represents the property owner’s unilateral act, causes many to fall into the trap of
believing that the law implements, and only should implement, an individual’s subjective intent.
The state, however, has no direct access to the property owner’s subjective will. It only can
determine the manifestation of the property owner’s will through words and actions. The state’s
dependence on the property owner’s manifestation of intent moves its inquiry from identifying
subjective intent to imputing intent.
Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV . 611, 611-12 (1988) (footnotes
omitted).
141. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
142. See infra Appendix.
143. This form is included in FAO 91-1 and reproduced in the Appendix. See infra Appendix.
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consider a rule akin to the one enunciated by the Georgia Supreme Court.
While subject to the risk that it may be enforced too rigidly, its underlying
philosophy, clear guidance and standardized method of evidencing disclosure,
and informed consent are the best effort at balancing efficiency and fairness
that this author has seen to date. As the court in Estate of Peterson noted:
The opinion recognizes that a client is free to appoint the lawyer hired to prepare the will
as executor and that in some cases this may be in the client’s best interest. Nevertheless,
the opinion warns that the risk that some lawyers may take advantage of being named
fiduciary for the client “creates the need for restrictions that offer assurance that the
naming of the lawyer as executor or trustee is the informed decision of the testator or
settler.” Accordingly, “an attorney’s full disclosure is essential to the client’s informed
decision and consent.”144

The drafters of a new rule would have further assistance in the American
College of Trusts & Estates Counsel (hereinafter “ACTEC”), which published
a comment on Model Rule 1.7 (written in 1985, prior to the Ethics 2000
revisions).145 The ABA’s Section on Real Property Probate and Trust Law’s
Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles146 offers similar

144. In re Estate of Peterson, 565 S.E.2d 524, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted).
145. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFE SSIONAL CONDUCT 156 (3d ed. 1999), available at http://www.actecfoundation.
org/pdfdocs/commenta1.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2004) [hereinafter ACTEC COMMENTARIES].
As a general proposition lawyers should be permitted to assist adequately informed clients who wish
to appoint their lawyers as fiduciaries . . . so long as the client is properly informed, the appointment
does not violate the conflict of interest rules of the MRPC 1.7 . . . and the appointment is not the
product of undue influence or improper solicitation by the lawyer.
Id. at 156. The ACTEC guidelines lay out the specific information that should be encompassed with the
concept of “full disclosure” and an “adequately informed” client:
The lawyer advising a client regarding the selection and appointment of a fiduciary should make
full disclosure to the client of any benefits that the lawyer may receive as a result of the
appointment. In particular, the lawyer should inform the client of any policies or practices known
to the lawyer that the fiduciaries under consideration may follow with respect to the employment
of the scrivener of an estate planning document as counsel for the fiduciary. The lawyer may also
point out that a fiduciary has the right to choose any counsel it wishes.
Id. at 155-56. ACTEC further defines an informed client as one who is “provided with information
regarding the role and duties of the fiduciary, the ability of the lay person to serve as fiduciary with legal
and other professional assistance, and the comparative costs of appointing the lawyer or another person or
institution as fiduciary.” Id. at 157.
146. Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, 1992 ABA SEC . REAL PROP. PROB .
& TR . L., cited in Bradley R. Cook, Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, 6 PROB . &
PROP., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 6. See Monopoli supra note 46, at 333 n.95 In an article seeking comments on
the proposed Principles by Bradley R. Cook in the “For Your Information” section of Probate & Property,
Cook stated that, while the Section Council of the American Bar Association Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law Section believes that it is appropriate for a drafting attorney to act as an executor or trustee,
“performing in such roles carries additional responsibilities and certain risks for the attorney, and no

446

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:411

assistance to any future drafters since it is also aimed at ensuring that
attorneys chosen as fiduciaries protect their clients’ interests by disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
Fashioning an optimal ethical norm in the context of drafting attorneys
as fiduciaries must be informed by efficiency, fairness, and the complex
nature of the attorney-client relationship. The process must take into account
the unique nature of the two-tiered transaction, and, viewing the attorneyclient relationship as “an agency contract characterized by information and
monitoring difficulties,”147 is also helpful in evaluating the current ethical
norm.
Even if the current rule were efficient, efficiency is not the only goal of
the ethical rules as a normative matter. Other goals, such as preserving the
unique fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, may trump the goal
of efficiency in this context. Thus, some immutable characteristics may be
included in the rule even though they increase its costs.
The ABA should revisit its approach to this issue under Rule 1.8 and
adopt a rule more closely aligned with the Georgia Supreme Court’s model.
That rule should provide that lawyers may not consciously influence their
clients to name them as fiduciaries, and it should provide for adequate
disclosure in all cases. It should require a standard disclosure, a consent form,
and the client’s signature. The issue of drafting attorneys as fiduciaries is
becoming increasingly important as:
[w]e are in the process of creating a “global society that is by far the oldest in the history
of the world. This aging process will be one of the dominant trends over the coming
decades in the industrialized world—and, for different reasons, in the third world as
well—reshaping societies across the globe.”148

attorney should undertake to serve as an executor, trustee or other fiduciary without being properly trained
and equipped to perform all of the associated tasks in a competent and efficient manner.” Id. See also
Monopoli, supra note 46, at 333. For example, Principle 9, titled Role of the Attorney in Advising the
Client, emphasized that, “[r]egardless of whether the attorney is named as a fiduciary, it is the responsibility
of the attorney to advise the client as to the considerations affecting the choice of an appropriate fiduciary.”
Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, cited in Spurgeon & Ciccarello, supra note 49,
at 1370 n.53.
147. Macey & Miller, supra note 44, at 965.
148. Nicholas D. Kristof, Aging World, New Wrinkles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 1, cited in
Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 410 n.21.
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These aging clients have physical and mental disabilities that “are far removed
from the paradigmatic client envisioned by the drafters of codes of
conduct.”149 The profession’s choice of ethical norms in this area should
reflect those disabilities and the resulting information asymmetry. It should
fashion an ethical norm that allows clients to efficiently contract with their
attorneys for this service, while remaining cognizant of the risk of
opportunistic behavior inherent in these relationships. Such an optimal rule
would be consistent with the traditional fiduciary view of the attorney-client
relationship, while it facilitated a much-needed service for many clients.

149. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 410.
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APPE NDIX :
State Bar of Georgia
Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia
On September 13, 1991
Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-1
(Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-R13)
Ethical propriety of drafter of will serving as executor.
It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee
in a will or trust he or she has prepared when the lawyer does not consciously
influence the client in the decision to name him or her executor or trustee, so
long as he or she obtains the client’s written consent in some form or gives the
client written notice in some form after a full disclosure of all the possible
conflicts of interest. In addition, the total combined attorney’s fee and
executor or trustee fee or commission must be reasonable and procedures used
in obtaining this fee should be in accord with Georgia law.
Question Presented: It is ethically proper for a lawyer to be named
executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared?
Disciplinary Standard of Conduct No. 30 provides:
Except with the written consent or written notice to his client after full
disclosure a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of
his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be
affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests.
The financial interests of an executor or trustee reasonably may affect an
attorney’s independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. The
conduct in question falls clearly within the coverage of Standard No. 30.
Standard No. 30, however, provides exceptions for this type of conflict. These
exceptions to a conflict of interest are the client’s written consent or written
notice to the client after full disclosure. These exceptions are in question here.
There is no limitation on client consent in Standard No. 30 unless the
“appearance of impropriety” prohibition of Canon 9 of the Georgia Code of
Professional Responsibility creates an implied limitation. It is our opinion
that the conduct in question does not necessarily create an “appearance of
impropriety,” and we note that the “appearance of impropriety” prohibition is
not included in the Standards of Conduct.
This opinion finds support in the interpretive guidance of the aspirational
statement in Ethical Consideration 5-6.
EC 5-6—A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him
as executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client
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wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid
even the appearance of impropriety.
The implication of Ethical Consideration 5-6 is that the naming of an
attorney as executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared does not
per se create an appearance of impropriety, but that such an arrangement
creates a risk of appearing to be improper, which must be guarded against by
the attorney.
A testator’s or settlor’s freedom to select an executor or trustee is an
important freedom, and it should not be restricted absent strong justification.
For a variety of reasons, the attorney may be the most appropriate choice of
fiduciary for the client. The risk that some lawyers may take advantage of a
lawyer-client relationship to benefit themselves in a manner not in the client’s
best interest should not outweigh that freedom.
This risk of self-dealing instead creates the need for restrictions that offer
assurance that the naming of the lawyer as executor or trustee is the informed
decision of the testator or settlor. An attorney’s full disclosure is essential to
the client’s informed decision and consent. Disclosure requires notification
of the attorney’s potential interest in the arrangement; i.e., the ability to collect
an executor’s or trustee’s fee and possibly attorney’s fees. Unlike a real estate
transaction where an attorney has a personal interest in the property, being
named as executor or trustee does not give the attorney any personal interest
in the estate or trust assets other than the fee charged. Waiver of State law
fiduciary requirements in the document is permissible as long as waiver is
ordinary and customary in similar documents for similar clients that do not
name the attorney as fiduciary.150
In the light of the above, full disclosure in this context should include an
explanation of the following:
1) All potential choices of executor or trustee, their relative abilities,
competence, safety and integrity, and their fee structure;
2) The nature of the representation and service that will result if the
client wishes to name the attorney as executor or trustee (i.e., what the exact
role of the lawyer as fiduciary will be, what the lawyer’s fee structure will be
as a lawyer/fiduciary, etc.);

150. For example, granting broad powers to a fiduciary or relieving the fiduciary of return or bond
requirements is a common practice, can substantially reduce the expense of administration of an estate or
trust, and does not relieve the fiduciary of the duty to administer the estate properly in or reduce
substantially the rights of the beneficiaries to enforce that duty. On the other hand, a provision that
attempted to relieve the fiduciary of negligence would probably not be ordinary and customary and would
be improper.
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3) The potential for the attorney executor or trustee hiring him or herself
or his or her firm to represent the estate or trust, and the fee arrangement
anticipated; and
4) An explanation of the potential advantages to the client of seeking
independent legal advice.
These disclosures may be made orally or in writing, but the client’s
consent or the attorney’s notice to the client should be in writing.
The client’s consent could be obtained by having the client sign a consent
form that outlines the information described above.
Consistent with other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue and the
Standards and Rules of the Georgia Bar, it [is] our opinion that it is ethically
permissible for testator or settlor to name as executor in a will or trustee of a
trust the lawyer who has prepared the instrument when the lawyer: (a) does
not promote himself or herself or consciously influence the client in the
decision; (b) fully discloses the conflict as described above, and (c) either
obtains client consent in some form of writing or notifies the client in
writing.151
Any executor or trustee is allowed by Georgia law to hire legal counsel,
according to the needs of the estate or trust he represents, and pay reasonable
fees for their services. O.C.G.A. § 53-7-10. An attorney who has ethically
named himself or herself as executor or trustee in an instrument he or she has
prepared may act as an attorney for the estate or hire a member of his or her
firm as attorney. The fiduciary and the attorney, however, must exercise
caution to avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest in this circumstance.
When a lawyer has ethically named himself or herself as executor or
trustee in an instrument he or she has prepared, the lawyer can receive fees for
performing both services. If, however, any costs of preparation or execution
overlap, the attorney must see that these costs are charged only once. He or
she may not charge both the client and the estate or trust for a single task.
As a lawyer prepares a will or trust instrument, he or she is performing
services for the client-testator/settlor as a lawyer. It is the lawyer’s task at this

151. In Pennsylvania, an attorney ethically may act as co-executor in a will that he or she prepares
as long as the attorney advises the client (in a way never specified) of the potential problem that the attorney
may be required to testify regarding the will if it is challenged. Professional Guidance Opinion 80-2 of the
Philadelphia Bar Association. The attorney also may not take advantage of his position as draftsman to
promote himself or herself or “sell” the ideas to the client. See also Professional Guidance Opinion 8-17
of the Philadelphia Bar Association (concerning an attorney naming himself successor-trustee in a will he
drafted).
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time to make sure the client’s wishes for the later disposition and distribution
of the client’s property are integrated into a plan acceptable to the client.
The lawyer acting in his or her capacity as an executor or trustee is
performing a different function altogether. It is the lawyer’s task as executor
or trustee to effectively implement the integrated plan for disposition and
distribution of the testator’s or settlor’s property. Not only is the lawyer’s
function different, the tasks are different. The lawyer should still be
appropriately and reasonably compensated whether the compensation is
provided in the instrument or by statute, but an attorney acting as a fiduciary
should not double dip fees charged to the client or estate.
Georgia law provides that an attorney serving as an administrator cannot
double dip in fees. See McDow v. Corley, 154 Ga. App. 575 (1980); and
Davidson v. Story, 106 Ga. 799, 32 S.E. 867 (1899). It is recognized that if
the attorney is serving as both executor or trustee and as legal counsel, it may
be difficult to sort out each task performed as one performed clearly in one
capacity or the other. Any fees above Georgia’s statutory provisions for
compensating executors that an attorney may incur in a dual role as lawyer
and fiduciary must be collected by filing an application for extra
compensation with the Probate Court under O.C.G.A. § 53-6-150. McDow,
154 Ga. App. at 576; and Davidson, 106 Ga. at 801. In keeping with both
Georgia law and ethical considerations, the total fees charged by an attorney
in such a dual role should be reasonable.152
ADDENDUM TO FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO . 91-R1
Form Notification and Consent Letter
[MR. OR MS. FULL NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[CITY, STATE ZIP]
Dear [MR. OR MS. LAST NAME]:
Because you have asked me to serve as Executor and Trustee under your
will, I must explain certain ethical considerations to you and obtain your

152. In accord Okl. Opin. No. 298 (Feb. 28, 1991) (stating an attorney serving as executor of estate
and as attorney for the estate may charge reasonable fees for each so long as charges do not overlap.); Ala.
Opin. No. 81-503 (undated) (indicating an attorney may serve as administrator of estate and as attorney for
the estate and may charge reasonable fees for each); Wis. Opin. No. E-80-14 (Dec. 1980) (stating that a
lawyer, appointed as guardian, may serve as attorney for the guardian, and may charge reasonable fees for
performing in both capacities).

452

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:411

written consent to the potential conflicts of interests that could develop. The
purpose of this letter is to summarize our discussions about your naming me
as fiduciary in your will.
A lawyer cannot prepare a will or trust in which the client names that
lawyer as fiduciary unless that decision originates with the client. The lawyer
should never suggest that he/she be named or promote himself/herself to serve
in that capacity.
Others who might serve as your fiduciaries include your spouse, one or
more of your children, a relative, a personal friend, a business associate, a
bank with trust powers, your accountant, or an investment advisor.
I can serve as executor and trustee if that is your desire. The potential
conflict arises primarily from the probability that I will hire this firm to serve
as attorneys for the estate and trust. An attorney is entitled to compensation
for legal services performed on behalf of the estate and trust, and the executor
and trustee are also entitled to compensation for services in that capacity.
When a lawyer has been named as executor and trustee pursuant to the ethical
requirements of the State Bar, he/she can receive fees for performing services
both as executor and trustee and as attorney as long as he/she charges only
once for any single service. Further, the total compensation for serving as
both fiduciary and attorney must be reasonable. If you name me as executor
and trustee in your will, I and the other lawyers in my firm will charge at our
normal hourly rates for all services performed. [NOTE: Modify the preceding
sentence as appropriate.]
I must also point out to you that a lawyer’s independence is compromised
when he/she acts as both fiduciary and as lawyer for the fiduciary. Some of
the potential conflicts in this regard are:
1. The question whether a particular task is “legal” or “fiduciary” in nature;
2. The question whether services being performed are really necessary in the
circumstances;
3. The propriety of giving the fiduciary broad discretionary powers and
exemption from bond;
4. The lack of independent review of the document by an attorney other than
the one who drafted it; and
5. There may be other potential conflicts that have not occurred to me.
In accordance with the ethical requirements of the State Bar of Georgia, it is
necessary for me to obtain your statement that the potential conflicts of
interests have been explained to you. In that regard, please review the
statement of consent below. If it is satisfactory to you, please sign and return
the enclosed copy to me. If you want to discuss any point further, please call.
If you decide not to execute the consent, please advise me whom you would
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like to serve as executor and trustee instead of me. If you have any doubt
concerning the information contained in this letter or the effect of signing the
consent, you should discuss it with another lawyer of your choice.
Sincerely,
________________________
Attorney
CONSENT
I, ____________________ (Client) ______________, have voluntarily named
as executor and trustee in my will and trust, ______________________
(Attorney) _________________, who prepared the instrument in his/her
capacity as my attorney. Mr./Ms. ______________ (Attorney) ____________
did not promote himself/herself or consciously influence me in the decision
to name him/her as executor and trustee. In addition, Mr./Ms. _____________
(Attorney) ______________ has disclosed the potential conflicts which he/she
thinks might arise as a result of his/her serving as both executor and trustee
and as attorney for the estate and trust. An explanation of the different roles
as fiduciary and attorney, an explanation of the risks and disadvantages of this
dual representation, an explanation of the manner in which his/her
compensation will be determined, and an opportunity to seek independent
legal advice were provided to me prior to my signing this consent.
Date _____________
_________________________________
(Signature)

